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Abstract
Purpose The wide range of tools and methods developed
for measuring and valuing health-related quality of life for
use in economic evaluations are appropriate for use in most
populations. However, for certain populations, specific tools
may need to be developed to reflect the particular needs of
that population. Patients without capacity—particularly
patients with severe dementia—are such a population. At
present, the tools available to economists for measuring and
valuing quality of life in these patients lack validity. Here, we
seek to understand the framework within which common
instruments have been developed, critique these instruments
with respect to patients with severely restricted capacity and
to develop a new way of thinking about how to value health-
related quality of life in such patients.
Method In this essay, we describe and critique the con-
ceptual framework by which common instruments used for
measuring and valuing quality of life have been developed.
Results We show that current common instruments used
for measuring and valuing quality of life in general popu-
lations are not appropriate for populations with severely
restricted capacity.
Conclusions We propose a new framework for thinking
about quality of life in this population, based on notions of
observable person-centred outcomes and utility derived
from processes of care.
Keywords Quality of life  Dementia: capacity 
End of life care  Resource allocation
Introduction
Economic evaluation is an established tool for decision
makers and commissioners in the allocation of scarce
healthcare resources. For the results of economic evalua-
tions to be considered valid, the methods and measurement
instruments used must be appropriate to the patient popu-
lation being studied. In most cases, the established methods
and tools of the health economist [1–3] can be applied with
little need for adaptation to account for the specific patient
population. There are, however, some populations and
fields of care where standard methodologies often do not
satisfy the needs of analysts and decision makers. These
shortcomings are particularly evident in the measurement
of health-related quality of life. Areas where it has been
argued that current quality of life measurement tools are
not adequate include mental health, public health, social
care and patients nearing death [4].
In this essay, we consider a group of people where
current methods for the measurement of quality of life do
not reflect their needs or the needs of those tasked by
society with allocating resources. This group is comprised
of people without the capacity to take part in the assess-
ment of their own health. In particular, we focus on people
with advanced dementia. Dementia is a neurodegenerative
disease which, in its advanced stages, leads to profound
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global cognitive and functional deficits (unable to recog-
nise members of their family, can speak only a few words,
unable to ambulate independently, care for themselves and
are doubly incontinent) [5, 6]. People at this stage of
dementia typically have little ability to speak or commu-
nicate and will require extensive help in the activities of
daily living. We argue that current models for under-
standing and measuring quality of life lack descriptive
validity (that is, content, face and construct validity) for
this population and that their use is therefore inappropriate
for allocating resources.
To make this argument, we first provide an overview of
the dominant framework in economic evaluation for mea-
suring and valuing health-related quality of life and
methods for the estimation of quality-adjusted life years.
We then consider and appraise critically the current
frameworks for assessing health-related quality of life
currently practised, including functioning (performance),
the capabilities approach and the notion of subjective well-
being (SWB). Then, we show how these frameworks lack
validity in a population with extremely limited cognitive
and physical capacity with respect to their ability to eval-
uate their own health or well-being; people with advanced
dementia are used as an exemplar population but such
cognitive deficit may be present in people with other health
conditions. We finish by proposing an alternative concep-
tual framework for developing an instrument to measure
quality of life in this group that is compatible with current
standard evaluative frameworks such as that used by UK
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).
Economic evaluation and the QALY
The role of economic evaluation in healthcare is to provide
information for decision makers on the relative costs and
benefits of competing demands for resources. A particular
approach to economic evaluation—cost-utility analysis
(CUA)—has become a key analytical tool for health
economists. Within cost-utility analysis, benefit from
treatment is measured in terms of quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs). The QALY is a metric that combines
information on both the duration and quality of life fol-
lowing treatment. The use of the QALY allows different
healthcare interventions for the same condition to be
compared using a single measure of benefit. More broadly,
it also allows for interventions across myriad patient
groups to be compared. As a result, decision makers are
able to make judgements on which basket of treatments to
purchase to meet a specified goal—for example, an
improvement in the health of a population [7].
It has been argued that under the existing CUA frame-
work, the QALY is not an appropriate measure of benefit
for certain groups, such as those nearing the end of their
lives or those without the potential for improvement in
health [8–10]. At the core of these arguments are the
notions that certain populations require either (1) care that
is unlikely to lead to improvements in length of life or (2)
that the QALY framework is necessarily biased against
such patients. These arguments have been addressed in
detail elsewhere [11, 12], and it is our view that the QALY
can be meaningfully applied to such groups, given the right
set of methodological tools to derive estimates of health
state utility values. The current difficulty lies in the absence
of such a set of tools. Using current instruments for mea-
suring and valuing outcomes would mean many, if not
most, interventions for people without cognitive capacity
and with a poor prognosis would not be considered cost-
effective [9]. Yet, it would be unethical and immoral not to
provide at least a basic level of care and comfort to indi-
viduals in need. The problem that remains could be
described as the ‘caring problem’—how to measure and
value treatment where the aim is to provide care for
patients where there is little expectation of an improvement
in the state of health or length of life, such as people with
advanced dementia?
Conceptual frameworks in quality of life measurement
Instrument validity and people without cognitive
capacity
Validity is the idea that an instrument is measuring what it
is claimed to be measuring [13]. There are numerous ways
of assessing the validity of an instrument [13], but the
immediate concern is whether current preference-based
instruments exhibit content and face validity in patients
without capacity. These facets of validity reflect whether
the items are appropriate to the population being studied
[14]. Content validity is concerned with the degree to
which an instrument covers the dimensions of health rel-
evant to the population and the degree to which it is sen-
sitive to changes in health status [14]. Face validity is a less
formal method of assessment and considers whether the
items are sensible and appropriate for the study population
[14]. We argue that current instruments, developed under
the three existing conceptual frameworks (described
below), lack content and face validity for people with
severe dementia or for other populations lacking cognitive
capacity.
Existing conceptual frameworks
There are no universally accepted labels to describe the
different conceptual frameworks under which existing
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preference-based quality of life instruments have been
developed. However, it is useful to differentiate between
three particular concepts that have influenced instrument
development. The three categories are not necessarily
mutually exclusive; some instruments may include ques-
tions that cover more than one category. Nevertheless, it is
still useful to understand the dominant conceptual frame-
works that have underpinned the development of current
instruments.
Functioning
The first class of instruments described here are those that
focus on functioning or performance, such as the EQ-5D,
the SF-6D and the Health Utilities Index (HUI), three of the
most commonly used instruments [14]. These include a
series of questions about domains accepted as nominally
health related—such as pain or mobility—and people are
asked to evaluate how an illness or a treatment impacts
their functioning in each of those domains. This functional
approach measures how successfully they feel that they
perform against a set of pre-specified criteria believed to be
important in defining their quality of life. In the case of the
person with severe dementia, who lacks even the most
basic ability in activities of daily living, and is unable to
respond, such an instrument lacks content and face validity.
Not only will people with advanced dementia receive the
lowest possible score on domains such as mobility, self-
care or usual activities, the progressive nature of the dis-
ease means that there are no interventions currently
available that could improve that score. Additionally, more
subjective measures of functioning—such as freedom from
pain, or feelings of anxiety and depression—may not be
answered directly by the individual. This matters, as
research shows that responses provided by proxy often
differ from direct reporting when completing outcome
measures [15–17] and that responses to less objective
domains (e.g. mental health) may vary more than responses
to more objective domains (e.g. physical functioning) in
older adults [18]. In advanced dementia, the accuracy of
proxy assessments is further compromised by the level of
skill required in detecting symptoms such as pain [19].
Capability
Recently, two alternative frameworks for conceptualising
quality of life have been proposed. The first of these is
based on the concept of capabilities [20] and is exemplified
by the ICECAP [4] and ICEPOP instruments [21]. The
capability approach seeks to define quality of life in terms
of what people can do and be in their life [4]. This differs
from the functional approach, as the emphasis is placed on
whether or not a person could achieve an objective should
they so choose. The aim, as described by Al-Janabi and
colleagues, is to ‘… avoid imposing a particular idea of
what a good life constitutes and to reflect the importance of
freedom to choose’ [4]. This principle is closely related to
the notion of autonomy—that is, the individual’s right to
partake in informed decisions about their life, their health
and their care. This autonomy is absent in persons with
severe dementia, and related domains are not relevant to
the population group.
To contrast this approach with the functional approach,
where the EQ-5D asks about mobility or depression, the
ICECAP-A asks questions about whether an individual
could be independent if they chose, or whether they are
able to experience enjoyment or pleasure. Again, the
domains being measured by capability-based instruments
do not exhibit content or face validity in people with severe
dementia—they have little independence, nor will they
ever again have the autonomy be able to choose what they
wish to do. Where a third party can make an assessment,
the person with dementia will often score low on the scale
without scope for an improvement. For example, the
ICECAP-SCM includes a domain about having a say in the
care they receive—this is, simply not possible for indi-
viduals with severe cognitive impairment, and any proxy
response would have to be at the lowest possible level for
that item. And as with the functional scales, where ques-
tions are more subjective (e.g. ability to feel settled and
secure), proxy responses cannot be considered as reliable
[18].
Subjective well-being
The assessment of SWB is based on a different methodo-
logical as well as conceptual approach. Dolan, Layard and
Metcalfe [22], proponents of the adoption of subjective
measures of well-being into public policy development and
analysis, use the definition given by the Stiglitz Commis-
sion (which reported on the measurement of economic
performance and social progress) [23]. In their report, the
Commission defined SWB as about providing a ‘…cogni-
tive evaluation of one’s life’. Such evaluations can
encompass happiness, satisfaction or other positive emo-
tions, as well as negative emotions such as pain or worry.
Dolan et al. [22] highlight that a key strength of this
approach is that people are able to decide for themselves
whether their life is a good one or not and that the ques-
tions used are conceptually simple. The application of
SWB to economic evaluation is at an embryonic stage, and
it is not clear whether it could (or should) supplant current
methods. SWB has at its core the notion that the individual
is the best judge of their wellbeing, yet it is clear that the
method is inappropriate for people without the cognitive
capacity to evaluate their life. It would therefore be left to
Qual Life Res (2014) 23:477–484 479
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an external observer to provide the assessment, and there is
evidence that important discrepancies can exist between
observer and patient assessments of quality of life [18].
Dementia-specific instruments
In using severe dementia as an exemplar population, we
give specific consideration to some of the key instruments
developed specifically for use in this population. These
include the DEMQOL [24], QUALID [25] (Quality of Life
in Late-Stage Dementia) and Quality of Life—Alzheimer’s
Disease [26] (QOL-AD) instruments. At present, none of
these has a corresponding set of preferences from which
utility values could be estimated for use in economic
evaluation, though such a value set could be developed in
future. Alternatively, these non-preference-based instru-
ments could be ‘mapped’ to existing preference-based
instruments—an increasingly common approach in health
economic analyses where validated preference-based
instruments are not available though the usefulness of so-
called mapping techniques has been challenged on grounds
that predictive performance is variable [27] and that results
may not be generalisable to populations other than that in
which the mapping algorithm is derived [28].
Consideration of the DemQoL and QOL-AD (Table 1)
suggests they have been developed primarily within a
functional or performance conceptual framework, reflect-
ing the inclusion of domains focused on physical or mental
health and relationships with others. In addition, some
domains reflect a capabilities approach, such as an ability
to do chores or to have fun, or whether people have enough
money. The QOL-AD is reported as having been developed
with reference to four domains identified by Lawton [29] as
being important to older adults [26]: behavioural compe-
tence, environment, psychological wellbeing and perceived
quality of life. As argued above, it is our view that func-
tional- or capabilities-based instruments will necessarily
lack content and face validity for use with patients with
advanced dementia or other severe cognitive impairment.
In contrast, the QUALID does not fit comfortably within
any of the three categorisations—functioning, capability or
SWB—outlined in the preceding section. Instead, this
instrument focuses on domains that can be observed and
reported by a third party such as a healthcare provider or
someone who has a personal relationship with the person
being assessed. These domains cover objective reporting of
observer assessment of the emotional state of the person as
well as signs of pain, agitation and mental distress. While
some domains may be difficult for proxy respondents to
answer accurately (e.g. those focusing on the emotional
wellbeing of the individual, presence or absence of obvious
distress), others are more subjective and appear to be
highly relevant (e.g. observed behaviours such as aggres-
sion, apparent physical comfort). This instrument exhibits
the greatest degree of face validity for use in a population
of people with severe dementia when compared with the
DEMQOL and QOL-AD. However, the QUALID is not a
good candidate for further development as a preference-
based instrument; there are too many items and response
levels, generating an unmanageable number of unique
health states (nearly 50 million) for reliable valuation [14,
30]. However, despite these limitations, the QUALID
highlights important criteria that may be applied in the
development of a preference-based measure for use in
patients without capacity. These lessons are considered in
the following section.
An alternative conceptual framework for instrument
development
We have argued that the current dominant conceptual
frameworks for preference-based instrument development
are inadequate for use in people with severe dementia. In
rejecting the existing approaches, the onus thus falls on us
to offer a replacement conceptual framework. In this sec-
tion, we provide what might be described as the scaffolding
from which a new concept of thinking about quality of life
Table 1 Overview of selected
dementia-specific quality of life
instruments
Instrument Domains Framework
DEMQOL Feelings (primarily focused on mental health)
Memory
Everyday Life
Overall quality of life
Functioning/capabilities
QOL-AD Behavioural competence Environment
Psychological wellbeing
Perceived quality of life
Functioning/capabilities
QUALID Mental health
Physical health
Functioning/objective assessment
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may be constructed. We refer to this as a capacity-adapted
approach.
We propose that the foundations of this new approach
are based on two fundamental considerations. First, that
domains and items relating directly to the person should be
based on criteria that can be assessed objectively. Second,
that the process of care very much matters in this popula-
tion, indeed more than it might in others. Therefore, the
notion of process-of-care utility is highly relevant. Finally,
in addition to the underlying conceptual foundation, any
future instrument should be developed so that it is suitable
for valuation in a manner that will allow QALYs to be
calculated and compared with values derived from alter-
native instruments. Our proposed approach is summarised
in Fig. 1.
Objective assessment
People with severe dementia are unable to complete a self-
completion questionnaire; therefore, any assessment of
their health state must be made by a third party. The evi-
dence shows that concurrence between proxy and person
responses is better for objective domains than it is for
subjective domains [16–18]. Those domains that have been
shown to have high concurrence between person and proxy
respondents should be considered for inclusion; it is likely
that these will be objective rather than subjective.
A brief overview of the literature on response agreement
suggests that a number of objective domains could be
considered. A study of people with mild-to-moderate
Alzheimer’s disease, in whom cognitive impairment is less,
found response agreement between people and proxies was
best (though still only moderate) for physical health and
disability [31]. Specific items that may be important in
people with severe dementia may include markers of
general comfort, pain control, control of agitation and
ensuring adequate hydration and feeding and their response
to pleasant stimuli such as touch, smell and sound [32, 33].
Process of care and process utility
In addition to items offering an objective assessment of
health status, we propose that the process of care is
important in this population. Process-of-care utility is not
typically considered within preference-based measures of
health-related quality of life. Instead, utility from a treat-
ment is typically considered to be derived from the results
of a process rather than the process itself [34]. By contrast,
a measure of process-of-care utility would give weight to
any utility derived from the process-of-care itself, separate
Fig. 1 The capacity-adapted approach for measuring quality of life in patients with severe dementia
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from the outcome. In people whose health status is unlikely
to change as a result of treatment, this process-of-care may
increase in importance.
The appeal of considering process-of-care in this pop-
ulation is that people (or society) may derive value from
the actual processes of providing care, as opposed to
achieving some desired level of health or improved health
state. As has been described, there is little scope for
improvement in the state of health for people with severe
dementia. Giving greater weight to the process by which
care is delivered may lead to a more accurate assessment of
the quality of life experienced by the person receiving that
care. In this respect, consideration of process-of-care acts
as a proxy measure for a particular health state where that
health state cannot be measured directly. It may also reflect
a societal view that values providing care to patients even
where the scope for health improvement is limited or non-
existent.
As part of a programme of work exploring interventions
for advanced dementia [35], we have undertaken a series of
interviews with carers and healthcare professionals work-
ing in this field. We will use the results of this study to help
determine what domains and processes of care are con-
sidered important. A systematic review undertaken as part
of this research has identified a number of elements that
may be of interest, such as pain management, adequate
feeding, comfort and care planning. These items are pre-
sented for illustrative purposes, as any instrument devel-
opment would require a dedicated and robust research plan.
What they do show is that such research is feasible and
therefore we argue that it should be undertaken.
Valuing process-of-care utility
To develop an instrument that measures health-related
quality of life is in itself an arduous task. To develop such
an instrument that can then be used to estimate utility while
accounting for the process-of-care is more difficult and
time-consuming. We now introduce a further difficulty in
that we believe it is necessary to incorporate process-of-
care utility explicitly within the instrument, alongside
health states. This is made challenging due to the risk of
double counting utility gains that may accrue through both
the valuation of health states and the valuation of process-
of-care in a single instrument. It is also the case that gains
owing to processes of care may be highly transitory in
nature, occurring briefly on each occasion and not neces-
sarily frequently repeated. To address this, we consider the
application of Multi-Attribute Utility (MAU) theory, which
we believe can be used to overcome each of these
difficulties.
The MAU model is an established, theoretically
grounded approach to economic decision making that
allows the combination of multidimensional measures of
outcome into a single outcome [36]. Key to the develop-
ment of the MAU instrument is that the individual mea-
sures of outcome are measurable by a common standard.
This approach has been used successfully to generate
utility values for the different versions of the HUI, one of
the functioning-based instruments discussed above [14].
We contend that the development of an instrument that
satisfies the criteria of MAU theory is possible. Using
MAU models to value health-related quality of life requires
that each item or domain contained in the descriptive
system of the instrument is first measured individually. A
multiplicative or multi-linear model can then be used to
combine this information, accounting for interactions
between terms and thus removing the risk of double
counting of health gains.
Conclusion
Conceptually, measuring quality of life is straightfor-
ward—find out what matters to people and then ask them
about it; in practice, this is much more difficult. A broad
and detailed literature has evolved to ensure that instru-
ments are developed according to best research practice
and to improve the prospects of instruments displaying the
necessary characteristics of validity and reliability. Any
new instrument development should follow as closely as
possible this best practice. However, we do believe that any
new instrument should demonstrate certain characteristics
which should be borne in mind during development.
Firstly, any new instrument should be suitable for use in
economic evaluation. As such, it should be designed with
the intention of obtaining a value set of preferences asso-
ciated with the states it defines. The most robust instru-
ments typically exhibit a certain set of characteristics; for
example, they should contain a maximum of nine domains,
each domain should contain ordinal responses, and the
questionnaire should be written in plain and clear language.
Secondly, we argue that the set of health states should be
valued according to the preferences of the general popu-
lation. Although there is no universal agreement about
which population should provide health state values, there
are two strong arguments in favour of using population
values. The normative argument is that as the general
population bears the burden of paying for care, they should
be given a say in what care is provided [40]; additionally,
as we cannot identify the patient groups that bear the
burden of the opportunity cost, it would be inequitable to
allow specific patient groups to determine the value placed
on specific treatment [41]. These arguments are addressed
at greater length elsewhere [11, 42] More prosaically, this
is the approach favoured by NICE in their guide to
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technology appraisals, and a novel instrument would have
an increased likelihood of gaining acceptance in research
settings if it were developed according to the currently
applied methodological guidance.
A further complicated situation arises in populations in
which individuals may suffer fluctuating capacity for a
range of reasons and with variable prognoses, for example
delirium. We do not attempt to address problems associated
with these conditions in this discussion paper, but further
instrument development would need to consider such cir-
cumstances. Finally, while we have focused here on people
with severe dementia, any novel instrument would benefit
from being suitable for use in people who lack cognitive
capacity for any reason, provided that a suitable set of
domains could be identified. This would improve the
ability to compare treatments in respect of resource allo-
cation decision making.
To conclude, the instruments currently widely used to
measure health-related quality of life for economic evalu-
ation are not suitable for use in populations without the
ability or capacity to respond. We have shown in this essay
why we believe this and why there is a need for a new
instrument that assesses objective measures of outcome as
well as incorporating benefits to be gained through the
processes of providing care. As we have argued, instru-
ments based on definitions of health status that focus on
either functioning or capacity are not suitable—such
approaches do not reflect the needs of, or care provided to,
people with severe dementia or those who otherwise lack
capacity. Such instruments lack face and content validity.
The development of a novel instrument, reflecting the
needs of this group, would lead to a more efficient allo-
cation of scarce resources while also improving the quality
of care received by people with impaired capacity.
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